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“EXCLUSIVE” JURISDICTION IN DELAWARE’S GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW: WHY STATES LACK THE POWER TO
STRIP JURISDICTION FROM THEIR SISTER STATES AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS
Michael V. Caracappa*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Delaware has carved out a niche for itself as a corporate haven.1 The
State Legislature has done this by taxing corporations at comparatively lower
rates and enacting laws more favorable to corporations than its sister states.2
The State also maintains separate courts of equity, the Delaware Chancery
Courts, which are distinct from the State’s courts of law.3 That division has
allowed Chancery Court judges to gain expertise in corporate matters,
making the Chancery Court an attractive forum for corporate litigation.4
Because of those benefits, among others, most corporations choose to
incorporate in Delaware.5 In fact, sixty-six percent of all Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in the State.6
Despite this, it is not uncommon for corporate litigation to arise in
forums outside of Delaware.7 While most Fortune 500 companies are
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1
Jane Haskins, Incorporating in Delaware: Advantages and Disadvantages,
LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/incorporating-in-delaware-advantagesand-disadvantages (last visited April 23, 2019).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See
Why
Incorporate
in
Delaware
or
Nevada?,
BIZFILINGS,
https://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/research-topics/incorporating-your-business/whyincorporate-in-delaware-or-nevada (last visited April 23, 2019).
6
JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, DELAWARE DIVISION
CORPORATIONS
2015
ANNUAL
REPORT
1
(2015),
OF
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
7
E.g., Daniel Fisher, West Virginia Tops List of Worst States for Litigation 2015,
FORBES (Sept. 10, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/09/10/we
st-virginia-tops-list-of-worst-states-for-litigation-2015/#eeb64a73b522; U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2017 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY: RANKING THE
STATES 1, 24–25 (2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/pdfs/Harris-2017Executive-Summary-FINAL.pdf.
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incorporated in Delaware, only two are headquartered in the State.8 Most
states apply the “internal affairs doctrine,” which holds that only one state,
usually the state of incorporation, should have the authority to regulate a
corporation’s internal affairs, including the interrelations of a corporation’s
shareholders, directors, officers, or agents.9 The internal affairs doctrine is
dominant because it provides certainty and predictability.10 The doctrine
honors expectations and avoids subjecting corporations to the conflicting
demands that may result if a single corporation operating in multiple states
was subject to various competing legal standards.11
Under early applications of the internal affairs doctrine, state courts
would deny having subject matter jurisdiction over controversies involving
the internal affairs of corporations’ incorporation in states other than the
forum state.12 As clarified by the Supreme Court in 1947, however, the
8

Caitlin Dempsey, Fortune 1000 Companies List for 2015, GEOLOUNGE (July 25,
2015), https://www.geolounge.com/fortune-1000-companies-list-for-2015/.
9
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a
conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or
between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because
otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.”); 36 AM. JUR. 2D FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS § 72, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018) (“[T]he ‘internal affairs doctrine’
posits that only one state, usually the state of incorporation, should have the authority to
regulate a corporation’s ‘internal affairs,’ i.e., matters that involve the relations inter se of the
corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers, or agents.”); 9 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. §
4223.50, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) (“Not all jurisdictions follow the internal
affairs doctrine.”); Jason S. Haller, The Constitutionality of Outreach Statutes Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 605 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court
of the United States has never taken the position that the U.S. Constitution mandates the
internal affairs doctrine. Indeed, the doctrine dominates the past and present of corporate
law—courts rarely hesitate to apply it.”).
10
36 AM. JUR. 2D FOREIGN CORPORATIONS § 72, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018).
11
Id.
12
Langfelder v. Universal Labs., 293 N.Y. 200, 204 (1944) (“[I]t is well settled that
jurisdiction in any case will be declined . . . where a determination of the rights of litigants
involves regulation and management of the internal affairs of the corporation dependent upon
the laws of the foreign State.”); Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Mich. 1965)
(citing Wojtczak v. Am. United Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449, 452 (1940)); Aston v. O’Carroll, 66
F. Supp. 585, 586 (M.D. Pa. 1946) (“These questions are so manifestly concerned with the
internal affairs of the defendant company that little room is left for argument. This court, like
the state courts of Pennsylvania, does not exercise visitorial powers over foreign corporations
under such circumstances.”) (citing Hopkins v. Great W. Fuse Co., 343 Pa. 438, 440–41
(1941)); In re Dohring, 142 Misc. 2d 429, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (“An action for
dissolution is deemed an internal dispute of a corporation. The older view was that the internal
affairs of foreign corporations were not to be litigated in courts of a state other than that of
incorporation.”); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, Choice of Law Considerations—Internal Affairs and
Statutory Outreach, in SHAREHOLDER DERIV. ACTIONS L. & PRAC § 2:13 (2017–2018),
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018). But see Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
330 U.S. 518, 527 (1947) (“There is no rule of law, moreover, which requires dismissal of a
suitor from the forum on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues which relate to the
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internal affairs doctrine is not a rule of law, but a consideration of forum
convenience.13 Over time, state courts softened their application of the
internal affairs doctrine,14 and, today, courts will apply the rubric of forum
non conveniens to determine whether retaining jurisdiction is appropriate.15
Complications arise in certain cases where the forum state lacks the power
to grant the petitioned-for relief, like dissolution of the corporation, but this
only factors into the forum non conveniens analysis.16
While its importance as a jurisdictional bar has waned, the internal
affairs doctrine remains an important choice-of-law doctrine,17 often tasking
foreign states with applying the laws of the state in which the corporation
was incorporated.18 For example, a New Jersey state court may be asked to
determine whether an officer of a corporation, incorporated under the laws
of Delaware, is indemnified by the corporation for claims brought against
it.19 Or a Massachusetts court may need to determine whether a corporate
internal affairs of a foreign corporation. That is one, but only one, factor which may show
convenience of parties or witnesses, the appropriateness of trial in a forum familiar with the
law of the corporation’s domicile, and the enforceability of the remedy if one be granted.”).
13
Koster, 330 U.S. at 527; see also O’Brien v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 206 A.2d
878, 885 (N.J. 1965) (“The basic question, however, is not one of power to exercise
jurisdiction but of the wisdom of doing so. In most situations it is desirable to leave such
matters to the courts of the state of creation of the corporation.”).
14
In re Dohring, 142 Misc. 2d at 432 (“This trend in the direction of expanding
jurisdiction over foreign corporations was noted by the First Department in New York in
1964. While earlier courts had considered themselves jurisdictionally barred from
entertaining lawsuits involving the internal affairs of foreign corporations, the more recent
view was to regard the issue as one of convenience and discretion.”) (internal citations
omitted); e.g., O’Brien, 206 A.2d at 886; Prescott v. Plant Indus., Inc., 88 F.R.D. 257, 261
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Although there is no rigid, generalized rule as to what constitutes ‘internal
affairs’ for this purpose, courts have declined jurisdiction where a decision would affect
corporate structure or policy, but have retained jurisdiction over cases involving breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, or contracts.”).
15
See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, Choice of Law Considerations—Internal Affairs and
Statutory Outreach, in SHAREHOLDER DERIV. ACTIONS L. & PRAC. § 2:13 (2017–2018),
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018) (“Once the jurisdictional impediment fell, the
question became whether a court should keep jurisdiction of an internal affairs case or dismiss
under the rubric of forum non conveniens.”).
16
See In re Dohring, 142 Misc. 2d at 433 (“[T]he fact that the relief nominally sought
(i.e., dissolution and forfeiture of the corporate charter) is not technically within the power of
the court does not bar the award of lesser or alternative relief in this action.”).
17
9 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 4223.50, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017); Heine v.
Streamline Foods Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 383, 391 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (“The internal affairs
doctrine is a long-standing choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state should
have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—the state of incorporation.”
(quoting VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del.
2005)).
18
Gregory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should
Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 90 (2008).
19
E.g., Vergopia v. Shaker, 922 A.2d 1238, 1239 (N.J. 2007) (applying section 145 of
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action or amendment is valid under Delaware law.20 Or an Alabama court
may have to determine whether stockholders may demand to inspect
corporate records.21
Each of the preceding examples were based on real cases and, in each
of those cases, Delaware’s sister states were tasked with applying Delaware
law, specifically Delaware’s General Corporation Law.22 But an emerging
issue—once called the “blunderbuss”23 approach to legal advocacy—has
found a home in several federal district courts and some state courts.24 Under
that approach, Delaware’s General Corporation Law strips other courts of
subject matter jurisdiction by reserving exclusive jurisdiction in the
Delaware Chancery Court.25
Four sections of Delaware’s General Corporation Law vest the State’s
Chancery Court with “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear actions brought under
those sections.26 They cover broad topics, including indemnification of
officers and directors,27 business combinations with interested
stockholders,28 the validity of defective corporate acts or stock and
ratification thereof,29 and the inspection of corporate books and records.30
Some of the sections have been around for decades, but the argument that
the Delaware Code).
20
See Finnegan v. Baker, 35 N.E.3d 778, 787 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015).
21
Pearson v. Westervelt Co., 203 So. 3d 73, 83 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016).
22
See Vergopia, 922 A.2d at 1245 (applying Delaware’s General Corporation Law);
Finnegan, 35 N.E.3d 778 at 787 (same); Pearson, 203 So. 3d at 79 (same).
23
Blunderbuss, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary
/english/blunderbuss (last visited March 3, 2019) (meaning clumsy and unsubtle).
24
E.g., Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Foti
v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir. 64 (2004); Yale S. Corp. v. Eclipse Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV0337-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL 2854687, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2010); Lynch v. Basinger,
No. CIV. 12-637 RBK/KMW, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012).
25
Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (finding the court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction due to the statute’s exclusive reservation of jurisdiction in the Delaware
Chancery Court); accord Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F.
Supp. 2d 376, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 65 (“This court has no jurisdiction to
hear a claim under a Delaware statute when the Delaware legislature has conferred jurisdiction
exclusively on its own courts and neither the Constitution of Virginia nor the General
Assembly grants authority to supercede [sic] such restriction.”); Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL
2854687, at *3; Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5; Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No.
HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013) (finding that
the reservation of exclusive jurisdiction in Delaware’s General Corporation Law
unambiguously tried to divest other state courts).
26
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(k), 203(e), 205(e), 220(c)–(d) (West 2018) (“The Court
of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions . . .
brought under this section.”).
27
Id. § 145.
28
Id. § 203.
29
Id. § 205.
30
Id. § 220.
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the statutes’ reservations of exclusive jurisdiction in the Delaware Chancery
Court prevent other state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction
over an action has only recently found acceptance.31
Two different courts within the Southern District of New York, along
with a Virginia state trial court, have held the jurisdictional reservations in
these statutes prevented their courts from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over actions brought under Delaware law.32 A Connecticut state
trial court agreed with that interpretation.33 But the Seventh Circuit, New
York State appellate courts, and a different Connecticut trial court have
disagreed, albeit each for different reasons, holding Delaware’s General
Corporation Law either does not or cannot strip subject matter jurisdiction
from foreign courts.34 From here on, and for ease of reference, the former
approach will be referred to as the “jurisdictional stripping approach” and
the latter as the “internal approach.” As will be discussed in depth in Part II,
however, it should be noted that the differences between those courts’
holdings are more nuanced.35

31
In 1998, the Seventh Circuit vociferously rejected the argument that the exclusive
jurisdiction provisions stripped it of subject matter jurisdiction. Truck Components Inc. v.
Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Nor do we suppose for one second
that Delaware set out to contract the scope of federal jurisdiction. . . . It is an example of the
blunderbuss approach to appellate advocacy . . . .”). But multiple post-2000 cases have
accepted the argument. See Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d
376, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir. 64 (2004).
32
Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 289; accord Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d
at 405; Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 65.
33
Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013).
34
Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1062 (“Delaware maintains separate systems of
courts in law and equity. Claims based on corporate arrangements go to the Court of Chancery
rather than to the law courts, where other contracts are litigated. Such an intra-state allocation
has no effect on federal litigation, which merged law and equity long ago.”); accord Sachs v.
Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005); Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc., No.
CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011); see also Finnegan
v. Baker, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 41–42 (2015) (applying sections 204 and 205 of the Delaware
Code).
35
Compare Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (holding the statute strips the
federal court of subject matter jurisdiction), with Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 64 (holding principles of
comity demand Virginia honor the statute’s intent to reserve subject matter jurisdiction in
Delaware Chancery Court), with Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 (finding that the
reservation of exclusive jurisdiction in Delaware’s General Corporation Law unambiguously
tried to divest other state courts, but this is in conflict with Connecticut policy and, thus,
cannot divest the State of subject matter jurisdiction), with Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d
at 1062 (finding the Delaware Legislature did not intend to try to strip subject matter
jurisdiction and, even if it did, it had no such power), and Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3,
with Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005) (holding relinquishing subject
matter jurisdiction would violate New York’s public policy).
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Whether the jurisdictional stripping approach ultimately prevails or
proves simply to be a passing fad, there are huge implications not only in the
field of corporate litigation, but for American choice-of-law jurisprudence
as a whole—and, indeed, for federalism itself.
First, as explored in depth in Part III, the jurisdiction stripping approach
overreads the Delaware Legislature’s intent and fails to honor the true
meaning and simplicity of the provision. The reservations of “exclusive
jurisdiction” in the Chancery Court are simply intended to differentiate
between Delaware’s other state courts.36 This is because Delaware maintains
separate courts of law and equity.37 The jurisdictional provisions in the
General Corporation Law are meant only to differentiate between internal
state courts and were never intended to strip jurisdiction from other states.38
Second, the jurisdiction stripping approach, as discussed in depth in
Part IV, defies American principles of federalism and does not fit within the
United States’ legal system. Each state, as evinced by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, is presumed equally competent to
adjudicate a case, even when a case calls on the state to apply the law of
another.39 Further, although almost all states adhere to the internal affairs
doctrine, it is not a rule of law, and it is ultimately the choice of law rules
and policies adopted by the situs state that determines what substantive law
applies.40 The Constitution simply does not grant state legislatures the power
to reach into their sister states’ territory and enact laws that would strip that
state’s courts of otherwise proper jurisdiction.41 Moreover, under the current
regime, the situs state has ultimate authority as to whether it would honor the
enacting state’s attempt to strip it of jurisdiction.42
Part II will discuss the emerging split in authorities and will discuss the
nuances of each court’s approach. Part III will discuss the Delaware
Legislature’s intent in using the term “exclusive jurisdiction.” Part IV will
explain why state legislatures do not have the power to strip jurisdiction from
other courts—even when those states apply the laws of the drafting state.
Part IV will also explain why a new subject matter jurisdiction exception for
corporations is unnecessary, contrary to American principles of federalism,
and potentially harmful to corporations.

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

See infra Part III; see also infra Parts II.A, F.
See infra Part III; see also infra Parts II.A, F.
See infra Part III; see also infra Parts II.A, F.
See infra Part IV; see also infra Part III, Parts II.A, F.
See infra Part IV; see also infra Parts II.A, C, F.
Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1965).
See, e.g., Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005).
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II. THE EMERGING SPLIT
A. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (1998): No Power or Intent to
Strip Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In 1984, Beatrice Company spun off a subsidiary named Brillion and
sold its stock to a small group of investors who, four years later, resold it to
Truck Components Inc. (Truck Components).43 Brillion and Truck
Components brought suit against Beatrice demanding it bear the costs of
environmental cleanup at and near Brillion’s facilities in Wisconsin.44
Brillion and Truck Components also sued Brillion’s former president who
had arraigned for disposal of the company’s wastes.45
The Seventh Circuit found Brillion was not the victim, but the polluter
itself, and found the fact Brillion was spun off of its incorporators did not
make them liable for its actions.46 As for the former president, he had agreed
to continue serving as president of Brillion after it was spun off in exchange
for Brillion indemnifying him for any actions he took while an officer of
Brillion.47 The Seventh Circuit held Brillion’s admission that it sued its
former president as a shareholder entitled the former president to victory on
the merits because any award would be circular due to the indemnity
agreement.48 The circuit court also held the former president was entitled to
recovery of expenses under Brillion’s corporate articles and bylaws, which
provided for indemnification to the maximum extent allowed by state law.49
Brillion was a Delaware Corporation, so the Seventh Circuit applied
Delaware’s General Corporation Law, specifically title 8, section 145 of the
Delaware Code, which provides an officer or director sued unsuccessfully
by the firm recovers defense expenses as a matter of course.50 The plaintiffs
countered by alleging the Seventh Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to award indemnification expenses under section 145, because subsection (k)
provided: “[t]he Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions for advancement of expenses
or indemnification brought under this section or any bylaw, agreement, vote
of stockholders or disinterested directors, or otherwise.”51

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Truck Components Inc. v. Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061.
Id. (applying section 145(k) of the Delaware Code).
Id. (alteration in original).
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First, the Seventh Circuit found section 145(k) did not apply on its own
terms because Brillion brought the action under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, not under
section 145.52 In essence, the indemnification action was brought as a
counterclaim and therefore subsection (k) did not apply.53
Next, reaching the deeper issue, the court held state law could not
prevent a federal court from exercising jurisdiction created by Congress.54
The court, in part, relied on General Atomic Co. v. Felter, in which the
Supreme Court held a New Mexico state court lacked the power to enjoin
litigants from filing and prosecuting a claim in federal court because
Congress grants the right to bring an action in federal court and the states
have no power to limit such right.55 Because New Mexico lacked the power
to restrict federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.56
Finally, the Seventh Circuit relied on a prior Seventh Circuit decision
for the general proposition that states have no power to enlarge or contract
federal jurisdiction.57
While the states have never tried to expand federal subject matter
jurisdiction, courts and commentators have long assumed that they have no
power to contract federal jurisdiction either.58 That assumption still holds
true and was affirmed by the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Marshall v.
Marshall—binding precedent on the federal courts.59
52

Id. (applying section 145(k) of the Delaware Code).
Id.
54
Id.
55
Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 12, 16 (1977).
56
Id. at 13.
57
Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061 (citing Beach v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 728 F.2d 407, 409 (7th Cir. 1984)). Beach v. Owens cites to a Ninth Circuit case which,
in turn, collects various Supreme Court cases supporting the proposition. See Beach, 728 F.2d
at 409 (citing Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1315–16 (9th Cir.1982) (collecting
cases)).
58
17A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4211 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr.
2018); Davet v. City of Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2006); Thompkins v. Stuttgart
Sch. Dist. No. 22, 787 F.2d 439, 441–42 (8th Cir.1986) (holding state legislation may not
preclude a federal court from exercising pendent jurisdiction even if it vests exclusive
jurisdiction in its state courts); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 713 (4th
Cir. 1961).
59
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 313–14 (2006) (“It is clear, under [Erie] that
Texas law governs the substantive elements of Vickie’s tortious interference claim. It is also
clear, however, that Texas may not reserve to its probate courts the exclusive right to
adjudicate a transitory tort. We have long recognized that ‘a State cannot create a transitory
cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action
in any court having jurisdiction.’ Jurisdiction is determined ‘by the law of the court’s creation
and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a [state] statute . . . , even though it
created the right of action.’ Directly on point, we have held that the jurisdiction of the federal
53
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Additionally, the Seventh Circuit stated that it would not “suppose for
one second” that the Delaware Legislature sought to contract federal
jurisdiction when it enacted section 145(k).60 Instead, the court believed the
exclusive jurisdiction provision in section 145 was merely intended to
differentiate between Delaware’s state courts.61 As the Seventh Circuit
explained, unlike the federal judiciary, which merged courts of law and
equity long ago, Delaware maintains separate courts of law and equity, with
the court of equity being the Chancery Court.62 The Seventh Circuit thought
it obvious that the recital of “exclusive” jurisdiction was simply the
Delaware Legislature’s allocation of jurisdiction between its own courts,
going so far as to call the Plaintiff’s argument “an example of the
blunderbuss approach to appellate advocacy.”63 Yet, that approach has since
found a home in certain state and federal courts, including the Southern
District of New York.
B. Virginia Trial Court (2004): Jurisdiction Flows from the
Governing Statute and Comity Demands Adherence, Especially in
the Case of Corporations
In Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., Foti made a written request, as permitted by
section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law, that he, as a Western
Sizzlin shareholder, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Roanoke, Virginia, be permitted to inspect the corporate books
and records.64 Western Sizzlin denied his request and Foti filed a Bill of
Complaint asking that a Writ of Mandamus be issued in accord with section
220, to compel Western Sizzlin to permit Foti to inspect the corporation’s
books and records.65 Western Sizzlin demurred, asserting that Virginian
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to mandate inspection under section
220 because subsection (d) reserves exclusive jurisdiction in the Delaware
Chancery Court.66 The Virginia trial court sustained Western Sizzlin’s
demur.67
In a thoughtful opinion, the trial court discussed how Virginian courts
may only be conferred subject matter jurisdiction by the State’s Constitution

courts, ‘having existed from the beginning of the Federal government, [can]not be impaired
by subsequent state legislation creating courts of probate.”) (internal citations omitted).
60
Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061–62.
61
Id. at 1062.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir. 64, 64 (2004).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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or General Assembly.68 The court said “[w]here subject matter jurisdiction
is acquired from the General Assembly, the General Assembly may . . .
choose to withhold, limit, or carve out exceptions” to the courts’ jurisdiction,
and comity suggests that the limitations imposed by one state’s legislature
must be universally acknowledged.69
Further, the court discussed how corporations are special when it comes
to applying the laws of other states.70 Citing the Supreme Court’s decision
in Broderick v. Rosner, the court described how becoming a shareholder “is
something more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding
relation, and as marriage looks to domicile, membership looks to and must
be governed by the law of the State granting the incorporation.”71
From this opinion, the court appears to have made two alternative
holdings: (1) Because the applicable statute restricted subject matter
jurisdiction to the Delaware Chancery Court, Virginian courts lacked subject
matter jurisdiction; and, alternatively, (2) comity demands, especially in the
context of shareholder disputes, that foreign states respect the state of
incorporation’s limitations on jurisdiction. As discussed in Part IV, the first
holding appears to be an error. And, as discussed in Part III, the second
holding misconstrues Delaware law. A traditional forum non conveniens
analysis would have been more appropriate here and could have resulted in
the same outcome.
C. New York Appellate Courts (2005): Comity Is Not a Rule of Law
and New York Public Policy Prevails
The New York state courts sided with the Seventh Circuit, but on
different grounds.72 In Sachs v. Adeli, the plaintiff, Richard Sachs, brought
a fraud action against Adeli and Klothes (NY) LLC, a limited liability
company incorporated under Delaware law.73 Sachs moved to compel Adeli
and Klothes (NY) “to authorize the release of tax returns filed by their
predecessor in interest.”74 The defendants argued New York state courts
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide this case because the Delaware
Commerce and Trade Law “vest[ed] exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute
in the Delaware Court of Chancery.”75

68

Id. at 65.
Id.
70
Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 65–66.
71
Id. at 67.
72
Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (App. Div. 2005).
73
Id. at 732.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 733 (citing DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 6, § 18-305 (f) (West, Westlaw through 81 Del.
Laws 2018, chs. 200–220)).
69
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The New York appellate court rejected the defendants’ assertion that
Delaware law could strip them of subject matter jurisdiction.76 Quoting the
New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, the court
held the doctrine of comity “is not a rule of law, but one of practice,
convenience and expediency.”77 The court explained that, so long as the
New York courts have an interest in the litigation, the purported “exclusive”
jurisdiction of the applicable state statute does not prevent the State’s courts
from exercising subject matter jurisdiction.78
Moreover, the court also cited New York’s strong policy “interest in
maintaining and fostering its undisputed status as the preeminent commercial
and financial nerve center of the Nation and the world.”79 The court held
that “that interest naturally embraces a very strong policy of assuring ready
access to a forum for redress of injuries arising out of transactions” occurring
within the State.80 Accordingly, because the complained-of transaction took
place in New York, the court held New York’s strong public policy must
prevail over the conflicting foreign legislation.81
The ruling in Adeli has its roots in Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United
Missouri Bank, another appellate case from New York’s First Department.82
In that case, the appellate court held a Kansas statute that reserved exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate of Kansan estates did not divest the New York
courts of subject matter jurisdiction.83 Citing the same decision from the
New York Court of Appeals as Sachs, the court relied on the fact that comity
did not require, or even suggest, that the State’s courts surrender their interest
in adjudicating disputes, which have significant contacts with New York
commerce.84
The New York state courts’ approach to this issue relies on the fact that
the doctrine of comity is not a rule of law and does not compel the State to
apply Delaware law.85 Rather, the doctrine of comity is simply one state’s
entirely voluntary decision to defer to the law of another to promote
uniformity, encourage cooperative federalism, or express the hope for
76

Id.
Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733 (quoting Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of Houston, 49
N.Y.2d 574, 580 (1980)).
78
Id. (quoting Ehrlich-Bober & Co., 49 N.Y.2d at 582).
79
Id. (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United Missouri Bank, 643 N.Y.S.2d 528,
531 (App. Div. 1996)).
80
Id. (quoting Marine Midland Bank, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 531)).
81
Id.
82
643 N.Y.S.2d 528.
83
Id. at 531.
84
Id.
85
Ehrlich-Bober & Co., 404 N.E.2d at 730 (quoting Mast, Foos & Co. v Stover Mfg.
Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900)).
77
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reciprocal advantage in a future case.86 When there is conflict, New York’s
policy prevails over the foreign legislation.87
Importantly, the New York courts seemed to assume the reservation of
exclusive jurisdiction was intended to strip subject matter jurisdiction and
that application of Delaware law would require the court honor that
reservation.88 Consequently, the court applied New York law and opined
that, even if Delaware law was to apply, the result would be the same.89
The New York appellate court’s decision to apply New York law is
legally sound.90 But the assumptions the court appears to make about
Delaware law pigeonholes lower courts and may create future issues. For
example, if a New York Supreme Court (i.e., trial court) wished to apply
Delaware law because a company is incorporated in Delaware and New York
law would have a different result, it could not do so if the applicable
Delaware statute contains an exclusive jurisdiction provision.91 That is
because a false dichotomy appears to have been created: either the court
applies Delaware law (including the letter of the exclusive jurisdiction
provision) or it applies New York law.92 The trial court has no option of
applying just the substantive provisions of Delaware law. As explained in
Parts III and IV, a proper interpretation of Delaware law or a conventional
application of federal principles would give the trial courts this option.
D. Southern District of New York (2006): Without Explanation, State
Legislatures May Strip Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Unlike the New York state courts, the Southern District of New York
gave effect to the exclusive jurisdiction provisions in Delaware’s General
Corporation Law in two cases.93 In Reserve Solutions Inc. v. Vernaglia, the
plaintiff, Reserve Solutions, Inc., brought a breach of fiduciary duty action
against Vernaglia, a former officer and director and a current shareholder of
the company.94 Vernaglia counterclaimed for, among other things,
inspection of the corporate books and records.95 Reserve Solutions was
86

Id.
Id.
88
See Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
89
Id. at 734–35.
90
See Ehrlich-Bober & Co., 404 N.E.2d at 730.
91
See Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
92
See id.
93
Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d 376, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declining subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Delaware’s exclusive
jurisdiction provision); Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (same).
94
Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
95
Id.
87
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incorporated under Delaware law, but had offices located in Manhattan, New
York.96
Reserve Solutions argued section 220 of Delaware’s General
Corporation Law unmistakably vested the Delaware Chancery Court with
exclusive jurisdiction over claims to compel the inspection of books and
records under the applicable statute.97 Pursuant to the statutory mandate,
Reserve Solutions asked the Southern District of New York to dismiss
Vernaglia’s counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.98
Vernaglia, in response, contended that the statutory provision reserving
exclusive jurisdiction in the Delaware Chancery Court was either procedural
or remedial.99 Statutory provisions that are procedural or remedial,
Vernaglia argued, have no bearing on substantive rights and, therefore, the
Southern District of New York has subject matter jurisdiction despite the
statutory reservation.100 Vernaglia’s argument rested entirely on a district
court case from the Western District of Pennsylvania, NVF Co. v. Sharon
Steel Corp.101 In that case, the district court, in considering an identical
recital of exclusive jurisdiction, held the provision was either procedural or
remedial, and the district court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction.102
The Southern District of New York sided with Reserve Solutions.103
The court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the exclusive
reservation of jurisdiction in Section 220.104 The implications of this ruling
are striking when taken to its logical ends. In a few sentences, the Southern
District of New York surrendered its ability to hear petitions for the
inspection of corporate books and records arising under Delaware law.105
96

Id.
Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and in
Opposition to Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Leave to File and Serve
Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint
at 10, Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 05-8622),
2006 WL 738793.
98
Id. at 2.
99
Memorandum of Law of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff i) in Opposition to Motion
of Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant to Dismiss the Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint, and ii) in Support of Motion of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff for Leave to File
and Serve Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint at 10, Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No.
05-CV-8622), 2006 WL 738792.
100
Id. at 10–11.
101
Id.
102
Id.; NVF Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
103
Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89.
104
Id.
105
See id.; see also Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp.
2d 376, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
97
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And this ruling may not be limited to actions for inspection because, as
discussed above, various other sections of Delaware’s General Corporation
Law contain these recitals of exclusive jurisdiction.106
Though this ruling is not binding in subsequent cases within the
Southern District of New York, in 2013, the Southern District followed its
holding in Reserve Solutions.107 This trend, if it continues, amounts to an
astonishing abdication by the federal court seated in the heart of the nation’s
largest financial center.108 But more problematic is that, if other federal
courts follow this approach and respect reservations of exclusive
jurisdiction, then the federal courts would, in effect, allow state legislatures
to contract federal jurisdiction in cases where the federal court applies the
state’s laws.109 As explained in Part IV.A, states do not have such power.
E. Proliferation of the Southern District of New York’s Approach
The approach to these recitals of exclusive jurisdiction taken by the
Southern District of New York in Reserve Solutions and Transeo, appears to
be proliferating.110 In Yale South Corp., an unpublished opinion from 2010,
the Northern District of Oklahoma declined to assert subject matter
jurisdiction over a petition for inspection of a corporation’s books and
records, because of section 220’s recital of exclusive jurisdiction.111 The
court relied on Reserve Solutions and Foti.112
Then, citing both Reserve Solutions and Yale, in another unpublished
opinion, the District of New Jersey also dismissed an action brought under
section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law.113 The court held it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action because of the statute’s

106

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(k), 203(e), 205(e), 220(c)–(d) (West, Westlaw through
81 Del. Laws 2018, chs. 200–220) (“The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions . . . brought under this section.”).
107
Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
108
See The Leonard Lopate Show, America’s Influential Trial Court and the Evolution of
the Justice System, WNYC (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.wnyc.org/story/americas-mostinfluential-trial-court-and-evolution-justice-system/; Ben Moshinsky, The 20 Most Powerful
Financial Centres in the World, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2017, 4:32 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-financial-centres-gfci-index-for-2017-20179/#20-shenzhen-the-chinese-city-climbed-two-places-to-reach-the-top-20-scoring-highly-inthe-infrastructure-category-1.
109
See Yale S. Corp. v. Eclipse Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0337-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL
2854687, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2010) (declining jurisdiction because statute contained
an exclusive jurisdiction provision); Lynch v. Basinger, No. CIV. 12-637 RBK/KMW, 2012
WL 6213781, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012) (same).
110
See Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3; Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5.
111
Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3.
112
Id.
113
Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5.
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exclusive reservation of jurisdiction in the Delaware Chancery Court.114
F. Connecticut’s Twin Approaches: No Power or Intent to Strip
Jurisdiction vs. Connecticut Public Policy Prevails
Two thoughtful opinions issued by trial courts in the State of
Connecticut explicitly address the emerging controversy over Delaware
General Corporations Law’s exclusive jurisdiction reservations.115 The first
is Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc. Children’s Corner was a Delaware
corporation that had its principal place of business in Ridgefield,
Connecticut.116 Three stockholders filed a one-count complaint asserting
their rights to inspect the corporate books and records under section 220 of
Delaware’s General Corporations Law.117 The defendant-corporation filed
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that
section 220 vested exclusive jurisdiction to decide controversies under the
statute in the Delaware Court of Chancery.118
The question was one of first impression for the Connecticut courts.119
Citing Fotiand Sachs, the court recognized the split in authorities and,
instead, turned to statutory history of section 220 to determine the Delaware
Legislature’s intent.120
The court found that, before section 220 was enacted in 1967, the
inspection of corporate books and records was not grounds for independent
and primary relief.121 This meant that, while the inspection of corporate
books and records could be a remedy incidental to another cause of action,
it was not sufficient to establish standing in the Delaware courts.122 In other
words, the inspection of corporate books and records was initially a remedy,
but not a cause of action.123
114

Id.
Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc., No. CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011) (“There is a split in authority in other jurisdictions as to
whether the Delaware statute divests sister states of jurisdiction to hear an action under §
220.”); Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Several other courts that have addressed the meaning of
the exclusive jurisdiction provision in § 220 have come to the same conclusion . . . . In
contrast to those decisions, the court in [Anderson], determined that § 220(c) did not deprive
other states of jurisdiction over claims under that statute.”).
116
Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *1.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at *2.
120
Id.
121
Id. (citing Perrott v. U.S. Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953, 957 (D. Del. 1944); State
v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, 18 A.2d 235, 237–38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1941); Parrish v.
Commonwealth Tr. Co., 181 A. 658, 659 (Del. Ch. 1935)).
122
Perrott, 53 F. Supp. at 957.
123
Id.; Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Del. Chancery Court, to Irving Morris 2
115
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Because the inspection remedy was only incidental and not a cause of
action, either the Delaware Superior Court or Chancery Court could order
such a remedy, if deemed appropriate, in any case brought before them on
other grounds.124 The court in Anderson found the Delaware Corporation
Law Revision Committee explicitly named the Court of Chancery to allow
new, standalone actions for inspection to be resolved expeditiously by one
trial-level court.125
In light of section 220’s statutory history, the court declined to find the
Delaware Legislature intended to try to divest her sister states’ courts of
subject matter jurisdiction.126 Instead, and like the Seventh Circuit, the court
held Connecticut courts did have subject matter jurisdiction because the
explicit reservation of “exclusive jurisdiction” was intended only to
differentiate between Delaware’s internal courts.127
Nonetheless, the court went on to differentiate Foti on other grounds.128
The court appears to have assumed from the Foti opinion that Virginia law
does not have some provision that grants its courts general jurisdiction on
matters arising within the state.129 Instead, it appears the court in Anderson
believed that subject matter jurisdiction in Virginia must be specifically
granted in each statute or in specific matters identified by the Virginia
Constitution.130 The court goes on to cite several Connecticut statutes that

(Apr. 22, 1965), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf
(“Although he does not say so, he seems to assume that an equitable owner could obtain
inspection in Chancery. I am not sure that this is the law. I believe that inspection in Chancery
either has to be incidental to a pending case in Chancery or in the law court. Thus, although
I could be wrong, I believe the granting of a right to inspect to an equitable owner, apart from
pending litigation, would amount to the granting of a new right.”); Letter from Irving Morris
to All Members of the Del. Corp. Law Revision Comm’n, Stock Holder’s Rights of Inspection
1 (May 6, 1965),
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf (“As we know,
granting an equitable owner of stock or a voting trust certificate holder (legal or equitable) a
right of inspection would introduce a new right in our law.”).
124
Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *2; Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Del.
Chancery
Court,
to
Irving
Morris
2
(Apr.
22,
1965),
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf; Letter from Irving
Morris to All Members of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, Stock
Holder’s
Rights
of
Inspection
1
(May
6,
1965),
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf.
125
Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *2; see also Letter from Ernest Folk III to Richard F.
Corroon (Dec. 20, 1966), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocumen
ts.pdf (“I am glad that Delaware will retain the established method of keeping corporate
litigation in the Court of Chancery.”).
126
Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
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vest the Connecticut Superior Court with original jurisdiction for all causes
of action arising within the states, except probate actions and those where
jurisdiction is explicitly provided by statute.131
This is an interesting point on its face, but one without substance.
Virginia civil courts do have general jurisdiction over civil claims, which
presumes original jurisdiction just like that of the Connecticut Superior
Court.132 Moreover, if the court’s understanding in Anderson was correct,
then Virginia could never exercise subject matter jurisdiction over cases in
which its courts would apply foreign law because the Virginian court would
have no statutory or constitutional provision granting it jurisdiction. This is,
obviously, not the case, as Virginian courts have applied foreign law,
including Delaware’s General Corporation Law.133
In Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., the Superior Court of Connecticut
for the District of Hartford disagreed with the District of New Haven’s
approach in Anderson, primarily that the Anderson court examined the
statutory history of the Delaware law where the statute, in the Carbone
court’s opinion, was “unambiguous” on its face.134 The court in Carbone
found no Delaware case interpreting the exclusive jurisdiction provision and,
accordingly, applied Delaware’s rules of statutory construction.135 Pursuant
to Delaware’s rules of statutory construction, the Connecticut court was
tasked with determining whether the relevant statute was ambiguous,
meaning it could be reasonably interpreted in two or more different ways or
a literal reading would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result.136 If the
statute is determined unambiguous, the Carbone court stated it must give the
statutory language its plain meaning.137 Moreover, the Carbone court
explained that, in accord with Delaware’s rules of construction, it must
presume that the General Assembly purposefully chose particular language
and that the court ought to avoid rendering any of the statute’s terms
131

Id.
See Virginia Courts in Brief, VIRGINIA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM (2009),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/cib.pdf (“The circuit court also handles any case for
which jurisdiction is not specified in the Code of Virginia.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-513
(West, Westlaw through End of the 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[The circuit courts] shall have original
and general jurisdiction of all civil cases, except . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (West,
Westlaw through End of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).
133
E.g., Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 269 Va. 609, 609 (2005) (“[B]ecause the
controversy involves the internal affairs of the corporation, the laws of Delaware, the state of
incorporation, apply.”).
134
Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013) (“The court in Anderson did not, however, perform a proper
statutory analysis.”).
135
Id. at *4.
136
Id.
137
Id.
132
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superfluous.138
Despite recognizing the split in authorities over the interpretation of
section 220’s exclusive jurisdiction provision, the Carbone court found the
statute unambiguous.139 Specifically, the Carbone court looked to the plain
meaning of the term “exclusive” and two other parts of section 220, which
state: “The demand under oath shall be directed to the corporation at its
registered office in this State or at its principal place of business,” and “[t]he
Court may order books, documents and records . . . to be brought within this
State and kept in this State upon such terms and conditions as the order may
prescribe.”140 The Carbone court believed it was clear that the Delaware
Legislature, as evinced by its choice in terms and by the provisions quoted
above, intended to permit only “the Delaware Chancery Court to adjudicate
the inspection rights of shareholders of a Delaware corporation.”141
Accordingly, the Carbone court found the Delaware law was in conflict with
Connecticut law and moved on to a conflict-of-laws analysis142
The Carbone court began by describing how Connecticut generally
follows the internal affairs doctrine when it comes to corporate matters but
may apply its own law where Connecticut has a dominant interest contrary
to the applicable foreign law.143 The court then stated that several factors
weighed in favor of applying Connecticut law, namely, that Nxegen
Holdings’ principal place of business was in Connecticut and the company
only did business in the State of Connecticut—not in Delaware.144 Because
of these two facts, and in light of the state’s interest in providing a convenient
forum for those doing business in the state, the Carbone court concluded
Connecticut had a dominant interest in the litigation and held it should apply
Connecticut inspection laws—and not the laws of Delaware (i.e., section
220), the state in which the corporation was incorporated.145

138
139
140

Id.
Id. at *4–5.
Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (b)–(c) (West

2010)).
141

Id.
Id. at *5 (“Accordingly, the exclusive jurisdiction provision in § 220 creates an
outcome determinative conflict of law between Delaware and Connecticut shareholder
inspection rights provisions. The court must therefore perform a conflict of law analysis to
determine whether Delaware or Connecticut law should be applied.”).
143
Id. at *7.
144
Id.
145
Id. at *7–8 (“Connecticut’s interest in providing a shareholder an efficient adjudication
of its inspection rights, in conjunction with the other factors discussed above, outweighs
whatever Delaware’s interest may be in having shareholder inspection disputes adjudicated
solely in its Chancery Court. Accordingly, Connecticut law should be applied in the present
matter.”).
142
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The Carbone court’s ruling is an important illustration of how, even if
the jurisdictional stripping approach prevails—which may seem like a boon
for corporations because it would force prospective litigants to travel to
Delaware to sue the company—such approach could backfire and be even
less favorable to corporations than the internal approach. This is because
Delaware law is largely more favorable to corporations,146 and, if the
jurisdictional stripping approach prevails, rather than the situs state
abdicating subject matter jurisdiction, it may simply choose to apply its law
out of public policy concerns.147 Under the Carbone court’s approach—and,
indeed, the New York court’s approach—rather than these exclusive
jurisdiction provisions promoting consistency in the adjudication of a
corporation’s internal affairs, these provisions may undermine the internal
affairs doctrine by forcing states to choose between surrendering subject
matter jurisdiction or applying the situs state’s laws.
The following section addresses the Delaware Legislature’s intent in
utilizing recitals of “exclusive” jurisdiction. While this may not be availing
to jurisdictions that fail to find ambiguity in the recital, it is important
nonetheless because it vindicates the Seventh Circuit’s and the Anderson
court’s approach.
G. Alaska Supreme Court (2018): States Cannot Strip Other States
of Jurisdiction
In Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker, a Montana state court found
the defendant fraudulently transferred property to a trust established under
Alaska law and the transfers were void as a result.148 The defendant filed an
action in Alaska, claiming the Alaska statute governing fraudulent transfers
of property vested exclusive jurisdiction in Alaskan courts.149
The statute at issue stated: “A court of this state has exclusive
jurisdiction over an action brought under a cause of action or claim for relief
that is based on a transfer of property to a trust that is the subject of this
section.”150 Taking up the issue, the Alaska Supreme Court said “we have
no doubt the Alaska legislature’s purpose in enacting that statute was to
prevent other state and federal courts from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over fraudulent transfer actions against such trusts. The
question, however, is whether “[it] can achieve that intended result.”151 The

146
147
148
149
150
151

Haskins, supra note 1.
E.g., Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005).
413 P.3d 1199, 1201 (Alaska 2018).
Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(k) (2018).
Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall, 413 P.3d at 1203 (citations omitted).
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Court held it could not.152
Discussing Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George,153 the Alaska
Supreme Court noted the United States Supreme Court long ago held states
were not required to acquiesce to attempts by their sister states to limit their
jurisdiction.154 “[A]cknowledg[ing] that several of [its] sister states have
concluded that similar statutes do, in fact, restrict their jurisdiction,” the
Court found those cases distinguishable because they were based on
differences in state law or policy that was not applicable to Alaska.155 The
Court found that under Tennessee Coal the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction
could not render the judgment against the Alaskan trust unenforceable.156
III. THE DELAWARE LEGISLATURE’S TRUE INTENT
From the hodgepodge of opinions above,157 three approaches can be
distilled with respect to the intent of the recitals. Courts like the Seventh
Circuit and the Anderson court looked to the legislative history and structure
of the Delaware state courts to try and understand what the Delaware
Legislature intended.158 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court did not consider the Delaware Legislature’s intent and defaulted to its
own policy interests to apply New York law.159 Similarly, the Western
District of Pennsylvania also did not look to intent, but relied on general
choice of laws conventions.160 The Carbone court was the only court to
explicitly reject considering the legislative intent,161 but joined Virginia, the
Southern District of New York, the District of New Jersey, and the Northern
District of Oklahoma in, presumably, finding the statute unambiguous.162 In
152

Id.
233 U.S. 354 (1914).
154
Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall, 413 P.3d at 1203 (citing Tennessee Coal, 233 U.S. at 360).
155
Id. at 1204.
156
Id. at 1205–06.
157
Truck Components, Inc. v. Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 1998);
Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d 376, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Lynch v. Basinger, No. 12-637, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012); Yale
S. Corp. v. Eclipse Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0337-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL 2854687, at *3 (N.D.
Okla. July 19, 2010); Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); NVF Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Toni 1 Tr.,
by Tangwall, 413 P.3d at 1203; Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S,
2013 WL 5781103, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013); Anderson v. Children’s Corner,
Inc., No. CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011); Sachs v.
Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir.
64, 65 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004).
158
See Truck Components Inc, 143 F.3d at 1061–62; Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3.
159
Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
160
See NVF Co., 294 F. Supp. at 1093.
161
See Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *5.
162
See id.; Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d at 405; Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5;
153
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sum, most courts have considered the Delaware Legislature’s intent, and a
majority read the statute as unambiguously trying to strip jurisdiction from
all other courts.163 The minority disagreed or completely avoided the
issue.164
In 2014, the Delaware Chancery Court finally spoke on the issue in Ex
rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust.165 In that case, William Nicholas Kloiber
(“Nick”), the former special trustee of the Kloiber Dynasty Trust, allegedly
took “action contrary to the status quo orders” issued by a Kentucky Family
Court.166 The current special trustee, PNC Bank, and Nick “filed petitions
seeking instructions and declarations” from the Delaware Chancery Court.167
The two parties contended that the Kentucky Family Court improperly
asserted jurisdiction over the trustee, the special trustee, and the trust because
the Delaware Chancery Court had primary jurisdiction over the trust.168
They implored the Chancery Court to “intervene to curb the perceived
excesses of the Kentucky Family Court.”169 In particular, Nick sought a
temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent Daniel Kloiber’s estranged,
soon-to-be ex-wife from seeking enforcement of the status quo orders.170
The trust at issue was an irrevocable trust agreement, executed in
Delaware, by PNC Bank, Delaware.171 Moreover, the trust agreement
selected Delaware as the original situs for the trust and called for Delaware
law to govern the validity, construction, and effect of the trust agreement’s
provisions.172
In its petitions, PNC Bank argued the Delaware Chancery Court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the trust pursuant to sections 3572(a) of

Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3; Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89; Foti,
64 Va. Cir. at 65.
163
See, e.g., Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061–62 (considering the Delaware
Legislature’s intent); NVF Co., 294 F. Supp. at 1093 (not addressing intent); Sachs, 804
N.Y.S.2d at 733 (not addressing intent); Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (considering the
Delaware Legislature’s intent); see also Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (reading the
exclusive jurisdiction provision as unambiguous); Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5 (same);
Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3 (same); Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 288–
89 (same); Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 64–65 (same); Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *5 (same).
164
See, e.g., Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061–62 (no intent to strip); NVF Co.,
294 F. Supp. at 1093 (not addressing intent); Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733 (not addressing
intent); Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (no intent to strip).
165
98 A.3d 924 (Del. Ch. 2014), appeal denied, 100 A.3d 1020 (Del. 2014).
166
Id. at 927 n.1, 928.
167
Id. at 928.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 928.
172
Id.

CARACAPPA (DO NOT DELETE)

1112

6/17/2019 6:43 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1091

Delaware’s Qualified Dispositions Act.173 Section 3572(a) contains a
familiar recital: “The Court of Chancery shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over any action brought with respect to a qualified disposition.”174
Without hesitation, the court dispelled any uncertainty about the
meaning of the recitals of exclusive jurisdiction in Delaware statutes.175
Echoing the Seventh Circuit and the Anderson court, albeit in greater detail,
the Delaware Chancery Court affirmed that the “exclusive” jurisdiction
provisions, which are common throughout Delaware law, are used to
differentiate between the state’s various internal courts of general and limited
jurisdiction.176 The Chancery Court explained that, in addition to its court of
general jurisdiction—the Superior Court—Delaware has various courts of
limited jurisdiction: the Family Court, the Court of Common Pleas, the
Justice of the Peace courts, and the Chancery Court.177 The Chancery Court
explained that the Legislature was likely trying to allocate jurisdiction
among the state’s courts—not to strip other states’ courts of jurisdiction.178
The Chancery Court further explained why these recitals of “exclusive”
jurisdiction are so common in Delaware.179 As the court described, the
Chancery Court is unusual because it was created by the Delaware
Constitution, which established the court “to administer the remedies and
principles of equity.”180 This line was interpreted by the Delaware Supreme
Court, in DuPont v. DuPont,181 as granting the Chancery Court “residual
equitable jurisdiction,” meaning the Chancery Court is presumed to have
jurisdiction over all equitable actions.182 In that case, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that, in order to divest the Chancery Court of jurisdiction, the
Legislature must both confer exclusive jurisdiction on another court and
ensure that the remedies in the alternate forum are equivalent to those
available in the Chancery Court.183
This explanation would make sense if the exclusive jurisdiction
provisions in the statutes at issue named other Delaware courts of limited
jurisdiction, but the Chancery Court’s explanation with regard to the court’s
residual jurisdiction is dubious. In fact, the residual equitable jurisdiction
173

Id. at 938 (discussing Qualified Dispositions Act, 12 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 3570–3576).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (West 2017) (emphasis added); see Ex rel. Daniel,
98 A.3d at 938.
175
Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 938–39.
176
Id. at 939.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 938.
181
85 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951).
182
Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 938.
183
Id. at 938–39.
174
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seems to cut against the court’s conclusion because, by default, the Chancery
Court would have subject matter jurisdiction—there would be no need to
confer it explicit jurisdiction as the Chancery Court is presumed to have
subject matter jurisdiction in equitable actions.184
Setting that explanation aside, the Chancery Court also stated that the
recitals of exclusive jurisdiction were intended by the Legislature to strip the
Superior Court of jurisdiction, which originally had jurisdiction over
corporate matters.185 This point echoes the findings of the Anderson court,186
and makes more sense, especially in light of the Delaware Corporation Law
Revision Commission’s committee documents.187
In a 1965 letter from Judge Collins J. Seitz188 to Irving Morris,189 Judge
Seitz explained how the enactment of section 220 of the General Corporation
Law would create a new legal right from a remedial right shared by the
Chancery and Superior Court.190 In a memo written to the Commission just
184

Id. at 939 (“To divest the Court of Chancery of its power to hear a particular class of
cases in equity, the General Assembly must both (i) confer ‘exclusively upon some other
tribunal jurisdiction of causes theretofore heard and determined in the Court of Chancery’ and
(ii) ensure that the remedies provided by the new tribunal are ‘the equivalent of the remedy
available in the Court of Chancery.’” (quoting DuPont, 85 A.2d at 729–30)).
185
Id.
186
Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc., No. CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011).
187
Cf. Letter from Irving Morris to All Members of the Delaware Corporation Law
Revision Commission, Stock Holder’s Rights of Inspection (May 6, 1965),
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf;
Letter
from
Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Delaware Chancery Court, to Irving Morris (April 22, 1965),
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf.
188
Judge Collins J. Seitz was a well-respected Chancery Court judge whose opinions in
cases like Belton v. Gebhart were upheld and cited in the Supreme Court’s landmark Brown
v. Board of Education decision. Harry Themel, Remembering Collins J. Seitz, Delaware’s
Greatest Judge, DEL. ONLINE (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/
columnists/harry-themal/2016/09/09/remembering-collins-j-seitz-delawares-greatestjudge/90124096/; Wolfgang Saxon, Judge Collins Seitz Dies at 84; Refuted Segregation in
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/21/us/judge-collinsseitz-dies-at-84-refuted-segregation-in-schools.html?mcubz=3.
189
Irving Morris was an esteemed Delaware lawyer who fought to desegregate Delaware
schools and was a leader in the corporate bar. See John Paul Stevens, A Struggle with the
Police
&
the
Law,
N.Y.
REV.
OF
BOOKS
(Apr.
5,
2012),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/04/05/struggle-police-law/; Sam Roberts, Irving
Morris, Who Fought for Justice Pro Bono, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/us/irving-morris-who-fought-for-justice-pro-bonodies-at-90.html.
190
Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Delaware Chancery Court, to Irving Morris 2
(April 22, 1965), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf
(“Although he does not say so, he seems to assume that an equitable owner could obtain
inspection in Chancery. I am not sure that this is the law. I believe that inspection in Chancery
either has to be incidental to a pending case in Chancery or in the law court. Thus, although
I could be wrong, I believe the granting of a right to inspect to an equitable owner, apart from
pending litigation, would amount to the granting of a new right.”).
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a month later, Morris presumed the Commission understood that the
enactment of section 220 would create a new right under Delaware Law.191
This means that without the express grant of jurisdiction, the Chancery
Court may not have been presumed to have jurisdiction, because the newly
created right of action, though equitable, had basis only in the common law
as a remedy. And, even though the Commission’s documents are not
explicit, it is evident that the Commission was trying to divest the Superior
Court—not every other court in the nation—of subject matter jurisdiction.192
Evidence of this intent is not confined to section 220 either. As the
Chancery Court explains in Ex rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, actions for
indemnification under section 145 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law,
the law at issue in the Seventh Circuit case (discussed in Part II.A), was
originally confined to the Superior Court because the remedy involved
money damages.193 In 1994, the Delaware Legislature reassigned corporate
indemnification cases to the Chancery Court through the enactment of
subsection 145(k), which contains the same recital of “exclusive”
jurisdiction found throughout Delaware’s General Corporation Law.194
Finally, in Ex rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust the Delaware Chancery
Court succinctly found: “When a Delaware state statute assigns exclusive
jurisdiction to a particular Delaware court, the statute is allocating
jurisdiction among the Delaware courts. The state is not making a claim
against the world that no court outside of Delaware can exercise jurisdiction
over that type of case.”195 Further, regardless of whether Delaware even has
the ability to strip its sister states of subject matter jurisdiction, the Chancery
Court found it (i.e., Delaware) would not arrogate such power to itself.196
In light of the evidence above and the Delaware Chancery Court’s
opinion, it is appreciable that the intent of the “exclusive” jurisdiction
provisions throughout Delaware’s General Corporation Law was merely a
way of allocating power between the state’s internal courts. Specifically, it
is apparent that the Delaware Legislature intended to strip its Superior Court

191

Letter from Irving Morris to All Members of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision
Commission, Stock Holder’s Rights of Inspection 1 (May 6, 1965),
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf (“As we know,
granting an equitable owner of stock or a voting trust certificate holder (legal or equitable) a
right of inspection would introduce a new right in our law.”).
192
See id.; Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Delaware Chancery Court, to Irving
Morris (April 22, 1965), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committee
documents.pdf.
193
Ex rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Tr., 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014).
194
Id. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(k) (West, Westlaw through 81 Del. Laws
2018, chs. 200–220), with id §§ 203(e), 205(e), 220(c)–(d).
195
Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 939 (emphasis in original).
196
Id.
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of subject matter jurisdiction, likely intending to funnel corporate claims
arising within the state to the state’s Chancery Court, which is highly
regarded for its expertise in corporate matters.197 This is a much more banal
interpretation than that of courts reading the provisions as staking a novel,
covetous claim to all corporate litigation arising under the state’s laws.
Rather than viewing Delaware as a jealous sister, other states should honor
Delaware’s interpretation of its own statutes.
IV. STATE LEGISLATURES CANNOT STRIP SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
FROM COURTS IT HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER
A much larger and more important question is whether state legislatures
even have the power within the federal system to strip subject matter
jurisdiction from federal or state courts. As explained below, the answer is
no.
A. Vertical Jurisdiction Stripping
It has long been held black letter law that the Constitution does not
allow states to contract federal jurisdiction.198 Only Congress may alter the
scope of federal jurisdiction, and the states are powerless to prevent the
enforcement of rights granted under its laws from being vindicated in federal
court.199 But no rule is without exceptions. State courts may contract federal
jurisdiction indirectly by completely eliminating a right under state law,
thereby closing both the state and federal courts to any action that would
have arose from the state law.200
197

See Haskins, supra note 1.
17A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS., State Attempts to Limit Federal Jurisdiction § 4211,
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017) (“Long ago Dean—later Judge—Dobie thought it so
clear that it could be stated as black-letter law that the jurisdiction of the federal courts ‘cannot
be limited or taken away by state statutes.’ This is still generally true, but it cannot be stated
without qualification.”). See Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. 270, 286 (1871);
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1109 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting
cases).
199
Chicago, 80 U.S. at 286 (“In all cases, where a general right is thus conferred, it can
be enforced in any Federal court within the State having jurisdiction of the parties. It cannot
be withdrawn from the cognizance of such Federal court by any provision of State legislation
that it shall only be enforced in a State court. The statutes of nearly every State provide for
the institution of numerous suits, such as for partition, foreclosure, and the recovery of real
property in particular courts and in the counties where the land is situated, yet it never has
been pretended that limitations of this character could affect, in any respect, the jurisdiction
of the Federal court over such suits where the citizenship of one of the parties was otherwise
sufficient.”); MCI Telecomm. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1109 (collecting cases).
200
See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 (1947) (“This pervasive principle of our
federal law, constitutional and statutory, was thus put by Mr. Justice Holmes: ‘Whatever
springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers,
the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under
the name of local practice.’”) (internal citations omitted).
198
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But it is still black letter law that the Delaware Legislature and, indeed,
all state legislatures lack the power to strip jurisdiction from federal courts
by a mere recital stating that one of their courts shall have jurisdiction
exclusive of all others.201 The United States Supreme Court’s precedent on
this issue has endured for well over a century: the Constitution simply does
not allow for a state to condition the vindication of a right granted by its laws
on the proponent bringing his or her claim in the state’s courts.202
Despite this, the Supreme Court’s holdings are not absolute; there are
exceptions which provide a state may exercise exclusive jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, such exercises of “exclusive” jurisdiction are not derived from
powers of the state, but are based more on tradition and judicial economy.
This will be addressed in this Subsection C of this Part.
B. Horizontal Jurisdiction Stripping
As the Delaware Chancery Court recognized in IMO Daniel Kloiber
Dynasty Trust the Constitution is not as clear when it comes to the horizontal
powers of the States.203 That said, the Full Faith and Credit Clause comes
close.204
The Supreme Court has long held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
disallows states from trying to divest their sister states of the ability to hear
claims arising under their laws or refusing to apply the law of their sister
state where appropriate.205 This interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has roots in a more than one hundred year-old Supreme Court case,
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George.206 The case was brought by
Wiley George, an engineer who, while lying under a locomotive trying to
repair the brakes, was seriously injured after a defective throttle allowed
steam to leak into the locomotive engine causing the locomotive to jerk
forward.207 George brought suit by attachment in Atlanta, Georgia, pursuant
to section 3910 of the Alabama Code, which made a master liable to the
employee if he was injured by a defect in the condition of the ways, works,

201

Chicago, 80 U.S. at 286; MCI Telecomm. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1109 (collecting cases);
see also Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker, 413 P.3d 1199, 1207 (Alaska 2018).
202
Chicago, 80 U.S. at 286; MCI Telecomm. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1109 (collecting cases);
Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“Any challenge to the federal court’s
jurisdiction based on Section 145(k) conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of
Chancery would fail, defeated by the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.”).
203
Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 939.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 939–40 (citing Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1965); Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951)).
206
233 U.S. 354, 359–60 (1914).
207
Id. at 358.

CARACAPPA (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

6/17/2019 6:43 PM

COMMENT

1117

machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the master.208
Tennessee Coal pleaded that George’s action should be dismissed because
section 6115 of the Alabama Code provided: “‘all actions under § 3910 must
be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction within the state of Alabama,
and not elsewhere.’”209 Tennessee Coal argued that to deny effect to
Alabama’s reservation of exclusive jurisdiction, the Georgia courts would
defy the principles of the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.210
George’s demurral on Tennessee Coal’s motion to dismiss was granted and
sustained on appeal.211
Tennessee Coal appealed the case all the way to the United States
Supreme Court where, writing for the majority, Justice Joseph Lamar
affirmed George’s demurral.212 Justice Lamar explained that the jurisdiction
in which a claim may be brought is not part of the cause of action itself.213
While the court trying a case arising out of the laws of its sister state must
apply the substantive provisions of that law, venue is not a “substantive”
aspect of the right.214 The Court stated:
A state cannot create a . . . cause of action and at the same time
destroy the right to sue on that . . . cause of action . . . .
[J]urisdiction is to be determined by the law of the court’s creation
and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a statute
of another State, even though it created the right of action.215
The Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was properly satisfied
by this approach.216 Interestingly, Justice Holmes dissented, but did not
write an opinion explaining his position.217
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee Coal was most recently
reaffirmed in 2006 in Marshall v. Marshall.218 In Marshall, the United States
Supreme Court quoted the above language in Tennessee Coal and held that
the Texas Legislature could not render its courts exclusively competent to
hear actions arising under the State’s probate code.219

208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Tennessee Coal, 233 U.S. at 358, 361.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 361.
Id.
547 U.S. 293, 313–14 (2006).
Id.
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The Court, however, did recognize the existence of a “probate
exception” in Marshall.220 The following Part discusses exceptions which
permit states to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and whether any such
exception—or, perhaps, a new exception—ought to be made for corporate
cases.
C. Are Corporations Special?
The Supreme Court derived the probate exception from language in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and, to quote Justice John Paul Stevens, “incoherent”
obiter dicta in Markham v. Allen.221 While limiting the largely foregone
exception, the Court explained that the probate exception to federal
jurisdiction arises in one of the three following circumstances: (1) where a
federal court is asked to probate or annul a will; (2) where a federal court is
asked to administer a decedent’s estate; or (3) where the federal court’s
exercise of jurisdiction will result in the attempt to dispose of property that
is in the custody of a state probate court.222 In each of these cases, a federal
court will not have subject matter jurisdiction.223 In his concurrence, Justice
Stevens stated the he would have put the probate doctrine to rest by
“provid[ing] the creature with a decent burial in a grave adjacent to the
resting place of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.”224
There is also another exception for “local” causes of action.225 “The
local action doctrine requires that ‘a local action involving real property . . .
only be brought within the territorial boundaries of the state where the land
is located.’”226 Under the local action doctrine, a claim of trespass on a piece
of real property or recovery of title or possession on that real property may
be brought only in the situs state of the real estate.227 That exception is
similar to the “domestic relations exception,” which holds federal courts
cannot hear cases relating to divorce, alimony, and child custody.228 There
220

Id. at 308.
Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., concurring).
222
Robert M. Harper, The Probate Exception to Federal Jurisdiction—Perplexed No
Longer—Probate Court Disposes of Property, 23 PROB. & PROP. 60 (Jan./Feb. 2009),
http://www.farrellfritz.com/wp-content/uploads/art-338.pdf. As an aside, the RookerFeldman doctrine was a doctrine of civil procedure that held federal courts, besides the
Supreme Court of the United States, should not sit in review of state court decisions. RookerFeldman
Doctrine
Law
and
Legal
Definition,
USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rooker-feldman-doctrine/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
223
Harper, supra note 222.
224
Marshall, 547 U.S. at 318 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
225
Bailey v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 609 F.3d 710, 721 (5th Cir. 2010).
226
Id. at 721; see Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 107 (1895).
227
See Ellenwood, 158 U.S. 105 at 107.
228
Bradley G. Silverman, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125
YALE L. J. 1364, 1366 (2016).
221
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is still an unresolved question as to whether it is a doctrine of venue or subject
matter jurisdiction,229 but resolving that issue is another Comment.
No court has ever applied the local action doctrine to a corporation, but,
for such well-respected courts like the Southern District of New York to
allow Delaware’s Chancery Court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
corporate matters,230 it bears noting the similarities in legal principle between
families, estates, real property, and corporations. Each are special entities
defined by the laws of their home state, and each are entitled to special
protections when it comes to administration. This begs a few questions:
Ought corporations to be treated with special care? Should the state of
incorporation be the only place where venue or subject matter ought to be
recognized? Or should it be left to the court in which the action is brought
to determine if the action is more properly heard in the state of incorporation
(i.e., rely on traditional principles of forum non conveniens)?
To a small degree, something akin to the local action doctrine already
applies to corporations. Today, courts other than those within the state of
incorporation lack the practical power to dissolve foreign corporations,231
though this has not stopped some courts from attempting to fashion remedies
in lieu of dissolution.232 Many courts that have considered that issue accept
that the internal affairs doctrine limits their ability to dissolve foreign
corporations.233 Some courts have even expanded this beyond dissolution:
“Courts other than those of the State creating it . . . have no visitorial powers
over such corporation, have no authority to remove its officers, or to punish
them for misconduct committed in the State which created it, nor to enforce
a forfeiture of its charter.”234
229
Bailey, 609 F.3d at 721 n.4 (“This Court has noted that questions remain as to whether
the local action doctrine runs to the jurisdiction or the venue of a court.”).
230
See Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d 376, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
231
Peter B. Ladig & Kyle Evans Gay, Judicial Dissolution: Are the Courts of the State
that Brought You In the Only Courts that Can Take You Out?, 70 BUS. LAW. 1059, 1075
(2015) (“[F]or an order of judicial dissolution to be effective, an official act must be performed
in the state of formation. In Delaware, if a corporation is dissolved by order of the Court of
Chancery, the Register in Chancery must file the judgment with the Secretary of State.”).
232
Peter Mahler, A Split No More: First Department Agrees, No Subject Matter
Jurisdiction to Dissolve Foreign Business Entities, FARRELLFRITZ (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2016/02/articles/deadlock/a-split-no-more-firstdepartment-agrees-no-subject-matter-jurisdiction-to-dissolve-foreign-business-entities/.
233
Ladig & Gay, supra note 231, at 1064, 1071 (“Other states’ courts have similarly
glossed over the distinction between discretion and jurisdiction . . . . In the other camp are
courts that have expressly considered the issue at any length. Those courts uniformly have
held that they had no power to order dissolution of a foreign entity.”).
234
Valone v. Valone, 80 Va. Cir. 45, 47 (2010) (citing Taylor v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life
Ass’n of New York, 33 S.E. 385, 388 (Va. 1899)).
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Nevertheless, there is considerable confusion as to which legal
principle the bar on foreign dissolution is grounded in, specifically, whether
the bar on dissolution falls under a forum non conveniens analysis, subject
matter jurisdiction analysis, or a choice of law analysis.235 The bar is, in fact,
discretionary, meaning it falls under the forum non conveniens analysis.236
Dissolution is unique, but only because it also has a practical dimension,
namely, that foreign states lack the actual power to dissolve corporations
incorporated in other states.237 The lack of power to dissolve a corporation
is simply a strong consideration in the forum non conveniens analysis—it
does not mean a foreign court cannot hear the action and attempt to fashion
an appropriate remedy.238
In situations where the forum state’s remedial powers are so limited, a
traditional forum non conveniens analysis will sufficiently safeguard the
corporation.239 A defendant-corporation could simply make a motion for a
discretionary dismissal for forum non conveniens rather than a motion for
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The fact that the Delaware Chancery Court has made a name for itself
as an expert court in the matter of corporate litigation, while this has,
understandably, led some courts to make assumptions about the Delaware
Legislature’s power with respect to corporate law, it would be a mistake to
create a new exception for exclusive jurisdiction in corporate matters. To
create a new subject matter or venue exception in cases involving the internal
affairs of a corporation would, most immediately, heavily burden the
Delaware Chancery Court. The Chancery Court itself has disclaimed

235
See Ladig & Gay, supra note 231, at 1074 (noting most courts applying the internal
affairs doctrine view it as a discretionary analysis, and arguing that states other than the state
of incorporation lack subject matter jurisdiction, because foreign states must give full faith
and credit to the state of incorporation and the foreign state-judgements interfere with
privileges granted by the state of incorporation and states like Delaware have explicitly
reserved exclusive jurisdiction).
236
See supra Parts III, IV.A., B.
237
See Raharney Capital, LLC v. Capital Stack LLC, 138 A.D.3d 83, 87 (N.Y. App. Div.
2016) (“An order of dissolution from a New York court would infringe on the sovereign
authority of another state by, in effect, forcing that state to extinguish an entity formed under
its own laws.”).
238
See id. at 88; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (“[T]he central
focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience, . . . dismissal will ordinarily be
appropriate where trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the
defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of
convenience supporting his choice.”).
239
See Ladig & Gay, supra note 231, at 1066 (“While there may be instances in which a
court can or may exercise jurisdiction in its discretion, there are certain types of cases in which
there is no discretion involved—those in which the court has no power to grant the relief
sought. In cases involving visitorial powers, such as seeking dissolution of a foreign entity,
the court has no power to enter the relief sought, so there is no question of jurisdiction.”).
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exclusive jurisdiction,240 and to force it upon the State would not only defy
expectations, but also overburden the State’s judicial system. Moreover,
such an exception would heavily discourage corporate litigation due to the
potential expense and strain of litigating in a state that could be thousands of
miles from the state of incorporation.
And finally, such an exception would lay waste to all choice of law
provisions in corporate documents and collapse an entire field of corporate
law. Rather than leaving corporations the freedom to specify a forum in their
corporate documents, the state of incorporation would become the
mandatory site of, perhaps, all litigation related to a corporation’s internal
affairs. A corporation doing business in New York might wish to resolve an
internal dispute within the state, but if it was incorporated elsewhere, under
a new exception to jurisdiction, the corporation and State of New York
would lose discretion in settling the dispute in New York. For some
corporations, this exception may prove more of a burden than a boon. The
creation of such an exception would be a monumental and calamitous shift
in corporate law, and such a cataclysm should be averted.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the current confusion, the principles announced by Supreme
Court ring as true today as they did in the late 1800s. The fact that the
Delaware Chancery Court has developed a unique expertise in the field of
corporate litigation over the last fifty years does not alter the Constitution.
The current error taking root in certain courts should be deracinated. State
legislatures lack the power to strip other states’ courts of subject matter
jurisdiction or the power to contract federal subject matter jurisdiction. And,
finally, while corporations are undoubtedly special legal entities, they are not
so special that a new exception to venue or subject matter jurisdiction needs
to be carved out that mandates all claims against a corporate be brought in
their state of incorporation. Such a shift would be overly burdensome for the
courts, potential litigants, and the corporations themselves. It is more in line
with American jurisprudence to employ a forum non conveniens analysis in
cases where corporations foreign to the forum state assert that their interests
will be prejudiced or that the court lacks sufficient power to settle the dispute.
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